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concepts expressed in this contribution were developed by Charles Delmotte. 
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 ABSTRACT 
 Delmotte and Verplaetse connect the issue of trust to legitimacy: what are the ethical 
boundaries that citizens can entrust the legislator not to transgress ? Moreover, a 
research-programme aiming to restore the relationship between tax payers and 
their governments demands an identifi cation of the limits to governmental taxing 
proclivities. Indeed, while normative tax theory focuses mainly on how to limit the 
productivity-loss due to taxation, this contribution scrutinises how to limit  rights-
violations due to taxation. 
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 2  Th e fi eld of public fi nance traditionally includes all four. See  H.  Rosen ,  ‘ Public Finance ’ in 
 C.  Rowley and  F.  Schneider (eds.),  Th e Encyclopedia of Public Choice ,  Kluwer Academic 
Publishers ,  Dordrecht  2004 ,  pp. 252 – 262 . 
 To demonstrate the eff ect of peoples ’ rights within fi scal processes, the authors 
raise the issue of endowment taxation. Th e concept of an endowment tax, being a 
levy on the market value of one ’ s talent, is the showpiece of the dominant, welfare 
economist approach to taxation. Taxing people on their talents has been celebrated 
as a theoretic ideal  – mainly since it avoids tax payers ’ minimising their tax debt by 
working less, and it thus maximises welfare. 
 However, both authors protest against the ideal of talent taxation, by showing 
how such a measure collides with the rights tax payers have over their own person. 
From a more abstract notion of autonomy, they deduce the  ‘ right to self-usership ’, 
that claims that all people have at least the right to control their own body and mind. 
By analysing how a talent tax would be practically implemented, the authors reveal 
that such a policy violates this right not once  – but thrice: measuring, valorising and 
eff ectively taxing talents, all interfere with a diff erent aspect of our general right to 
self-usership  – and signal the illegitimacy of this fi scal measure. 
 As the right to self-usership demands that taxation ought to stay away from 
the sphere constructed by our body and mind, both authors explain why an 
income tax can possibly respect this demand. Since income does not belong to the 
personal domain itself, but is rather a product of consensual economic interactions, 
governments are not a priori prohibited from imposing fi scal and other duties on 
one ’ s realised income, as long as these are detached from the choices people make 
on how to use their bodies and minds. 
 1. INTRODUCTION: TOWARDS A THEORY OF 
LEGITIMATE TAXATION 
 From a normative perspective a tax system can be assessed in two ways. A fi rst 
kind of inquiry deals with the question  ‘ Why should society levy taxes ? ’ Th is 
research investigates the acceptability of the goals of public expenditure. Some 
of these are widely accepted, such as provision of public goods and funding of 
social security, while other objectives remain more debatable, such as correction 
for market failure and redistribution of wealth. 2 A second kind of inquiry 
deals with the question  ‘ How should society levy taxes ? ’. If we assume that 
society agrees on (some of) these goals, an important issue remains how public 
authorities can attain these fi nalities in a  legitimate way ? Both questions should 
be treated separately. As a matter of principle, public spending should not only 
contribute to the abovementioned goals, a priori it should realise it ’ s funding 
through procedures that are  compatible with people ’ s fundamental moral rights 
and liberties. Th e signifi cance of this  ‘ legitimacy question ’ originates from the 
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 3  J.  Tomasi ,  Free Market Fairness ,  Princeton University Press ,  Princeton  (NJ)  2013 ,  p. 76 . 
(emphasis added). 
 4  Legitimacy is thus presented here as Peter Vallentyne understands the  ‘ justice ’ of a tax 
system, which means that it  ‘ wrongs no one, in the sense of infringing no one ’ s rights. ’ See 
 P.  Vallentyne ,  ‘ Taxation, redistribution and property Rights ’ in  A.  Marmor (ed.),  Th e 
Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law ,  Routledge ,  New York  2012 ,  pp. 291 – 301 . 
 5  Th e current context of taxation is one of rising distrust between taxpayers and tax 
administrations. For further analysis of the notion of trust see the other chapters in this book, 
notably those from Erich Kirchler et al (chapter 15) and Alisson Christians (chapter 
7). Th e latter sketches the present time as follows:  ‘ Academics, watchdogs, journalists, and 
activists express deep skepticism about the motives of elected politicians with respect to 
tax policy in the context of multinationals that are simultaneously large political donors, 
outsize infl uencers of legal reforms, and direct benefi ciaries of tax largesse. Th is skepticism 
 … is arguably the source of a deepening distrust within societies regarding the design and 
implementation of the tax system. ’ See also  A.  Christians ,  ‘ Putting the Reign Back in 
Sovereign ’ ( 2013 )  40  Pepperdine Law Review  1373 . For more information on the fi scal crisis 
and the rise of tax avoidance see  R.S.  Avi-Yonah ,  ‘ Globalization, Tax Competition, and the 
Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State ’ ( 2000 )  113  Harvard Law Review  1573 . 
  Related, the EU estimates that European tax administrations lose annually about  € 1 trillion 
due to tax evasion and avoidance. (For more information, see:  http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_
customs/taxation/tax_fraud_evasion/index_en.htm ). More empirical material on current tax 
base erosion due to tax planning strategies can also be found at:  http://www.oecd.org/tax/
beps-about.html . 
classical philosophical and legal insight that governmental action can only 
be undertaken within the boundaries set by people ’ s fundamental rights and 
liberties. As echoed by political philosopher John Tomasi, these rights and 
liberties are the  ‘ prerequisites for the  legitimate exercise of democratic authority ’. 3 
In order to be normatively tolerable a tax system should not only be effi  cacious 
and have the best intentions, it needs to be legitimate as well. 4 
 In an age of distrust, when residents seem increasingly unwilling to pay taxes, 
this  ‘ legitimacy ’ requirement demands more attention. 5 If public authorities 
want to restore the damaged relationship with their citizens, the rules that 
guide taxation ought to be justifi ed within a balanced theory that addresses 
tax payers as active holders of rights and not merely as welfare-contributors. 
Hoping to re-establish a solid and durable relation between spending authorities 
and sponsoring citizens, the latter ’ s fi scal duties cannot simply be a function 
of economic effi  ciency-models. Conversely, a new fi scal contract that aims at 
increased compliance requires  – among other things  – a theory of  legitimate 
taxation that examines tax payers ’ particular moral rights and their relevance 
within fi scal policy. 
 Surprisingly, up to now tax scholars dedicated little to no attention to this 
 ‘ legitimacy ’ requirement. In search for the ideal tax system, the dominant 
 Optimal Taxation Th eory focused mainly on considerations of effi  ciency  – oft en 
supplemented with some notion of equity. Whether the suggested policy also 
adheres to people ’ s moral rights and liberties seems to be neglected in current 
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 6  Th e traditional prior aim of the dominant  ‘ theory of optimal taxation ’ is to reduce ineffi  ciencies 
and market distortions imposed by taxation. See, for example,  J.  Slemrod ,  ‘ Optimal Taxation 
and Optimal Tax Systems ’ ( 1990 )  4  Journal of Economic Perspectives  157 . For a situation of 
tax theory within the traditional utilitarian framework, see  D.  Shaviro ,  ‘ Beyond the Pro-
Consumption Tax Consensus ’ ( 2007 )  60  Stanford Law Review  745, 750 – 760 . Th is model 
has led to rather debatable standpoints from the perspective of people ’ s (equal) rights, for 
example tax scholars ’ traditional rejection of taxation of capital income, supported by both the 
Atkinson-Stiglitz and Chamley-Judd theorem. For a critical discussion on this issue, see 
 T.  Piketty and  E.  Saez ,  ‘ A Th eory Of Optimal Capital Taxation ’ ( April 2012 )  National Bureau 
of Economic Research Working Paper  17989 :  http://www.nber.org/papers/w17989 , accessed 
10.10.2015. For an avowal on tax theories ’ disregard for other aims, see  J.  Bankman and 
 D.  Shaviro ,  ‘ Piketty in America :  A Tale of Two Literatures ’ ( 2015 )  68  Tax Law Review  453 . 
 7  For literature on endowment taxation (hereaft er in footnotes: ET) from the angle of welfare 
economics, see  J.  Mirrlees ,  ‘ An exploration in the theory of optimum income taxation ’ 
( 1971 )  38  Th e Review of Economic Studies  175 ;  G.  Akerlof ,  ‘ Th e economics of  “ tagging ” as 
applied to the optimal income tax, welfare programs, and manpower planning ’ ( 1978 )  68  Th e 
American Economic Review  8 ;  R.  Musgrave and  P.  Musgrave ,  Public Finance in Th eory and 
Practice ,  McGraw-Hill ,  New York  1989 ,  pp. 291 – 293 . 
 8  Recently, an increasing number of tax scholars have proposed using ET:  D.  Shaviro , 
 ‘ Inequality, wealth, and endowment ’ ( 2000 )  53  Tax Law Review  397 ;  L.  Zelenak ,  ‘ Taxing 
endowment ’ ( 2006 )  55  Duke Law Journal  1145 ;  K.  Stark ,  ‘ Enslaving the beachcomber: some 
thoughts on the liberty objections to endowment taxation ’ ( 2005 )  28  Canadian Journal of 
Law  & Jurisprudence  47 ;  L.  Kaplow ,  Th e Th eory of Taxation and Public Economics ,  Princeton 
University Press ,  Princeton  (NJ)  2008 ,  pp. 96 – 104 ;  K.  Logue and  J.  Slemrod ,  ‘ Genes as 
tags :  Th e tax implications of widely available genetic information ’ ( 2008 )  61  National Tax 
Journal  843 ;  G.  Mankiw and  M.  Weinzierl ,  ‘ Th e optimal taxation of height :  A case study 
of utilitarian income redistribution ’ ( 2010 )  2 ( 1 )  American Economic Journal :  Economic 
Policy  155 ;  E.  Plug ,  J.  Hartog and  B.  Van Praag ,  ‘ If we knew ability, how would we tax 
individuals? ’ ( 1999 )  72  Journal of Public Economics  183 . 
literature. 6 One the best examples of this myopic search for an ideal tax system is 
the idea of an endowment tax, or taxing citizens on whatever their  talents (and 
thus not their actual income) could make them earn. Already in the  ’ 70s, leading 
economists like Akerloff , Mirrlees and Musgrave promoted taxation of one ’ s 
innate earning ability as the ideal tax base. 7 Th is century, leading tax scholars like 
Daniel Shaviro, Kirk Stark, Luis Kaplow, Lawrence Zelenak, Logue and Slemrod 
defend taxation of potential earnings as the optimal tax base. 8 Endowment 
taxation off ers an excellent illustration how a certain tax proposal can at the same 
time be normatively most appealing (since it would gather the necessary revenue 
in a highly effi  cient way) and normatively most horrendous (since it might 
degrade citizens into passive welfare-donators). In our view, taking people ’ s 
talents as the proper benchmark for taxation constitutes a multiple violation of 
people ’ s moral rights. By pinpointing what is wrong with this measure, we like 
to uncover the normative  minima that any taxation policy should respect. Th ese 
conditions demarcate the operative fi eld for public authorities, wherein they 
ought to realise the abovementioned goals in a maximally effi  cient way. 
 In this contribution, we fi rst (section 2) clarify the idea of an endowment tax, 
the arguments of effi  ciency and equity that are raised in favour of it and the two 
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 9  For more information on philosophical ET literature, see  R.  Dworkin ,  ‘ What is equality? 
Part 2 :  Equality of resources ’ ( 1981 )  10  Philosophy  & Public Aff airs  283 (under the form 
of an obligatory insurance system for endowments);  J.  Roemer ,  ‘ A pragmatic theory of 
responsibility for the egalitarian planner ’ ( 1993 )  22  Philosophy  & Public Aff airs  146 ;  S.  White , 
 ‘ Th e egalitarian earnings subsidy scheme ’ ( 1999 )  29  British Journal of Political Science  601 . For 
literature on ET from the angle of welfare economics, see n. 7 above. Th e contributions from 
recent tax scholarship are mentioned under n. 8. 
most heard  – but unconvincing  – objections. Next (section 3) we introduce a 
novel moral principle ( self-usership ) to which any taxation system should adhere. 
Derived from the concept of autonomy, self-usership will guarantee that each 
person has a (limited) controlling power over his own body and mind. Once 
we have stipulated what particular rights persons do have over their selves and 
their activities, we will identify the infringements of ET and its illegitimacy. We 
will argue (section 4) that any taxation policy that is based on the assessment, 
valuation and taxation of personal characteristics (body, mind, capacities)  – or 
the activities resulting from the use of these characteristics  – is at odds with 
self-usership. At the end of this chapter (section 5), we address some possible 
objections, and simultaneously, formulate some conclusions that involve  income 
taxation . We will make clear which kind of income taxation will be in line with 
the right to self-usership  – and thus possibly legitimate. 
 2. WHAT IS ENDOWMENT TAXATION ? 
 Imagine John, who works as a local police offi  cer aft er graduating from high 
school. He is not keen on his job, but considering his average talents, it is the 
one that pays him the most. He works 200 hours a month, and earns  € 4,000. 
Every day, on his way to work, he passes David, who is gift ed with extraordinary 
mathematical talents that have allowed him to build a successful and well-paid 
career as a civil engineer in a construction company. Because David likes to 
spend more time pursuing his lifetime interest in philosophy, he decided to cut 
back on his engineering work. To fund this shift , a part-time job of 40 hours a 
month will easily suffi  ce. Since David is a valuable engineer, the company still 
wants to pay him  € 4,000 a month. 
 Most taxation systems will tax John and David equally. A taxpayer ’ s  actual 
income, rather than his  possible income, serves as the common tax base. However, 
leading academics want to abandon this basic principle of tax policy. For a few 
decades, economists (James Mirrlees, George Akerlof, Richard Musgrave), 
and more recently, tax scholars (Daniel Shaviro, Louis Kaplow, Kirk Stark, 
Lawrence Zelenak, Lee Fenell) and some philosophers (Ronald Dworkin, John 
Roemer, Stuart White), have questioned the justifi cation of using  actual income 
to calculate taxes  – and stress the signifi cance of a person ’ s  potential income. 9 
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 10  Th is argument can be traced back to the theory of optimal taxation, launched in  J.  Mirrlees , 
 ‘ An exploration in the theory of optimum income taxation ’ ( 1971 )  38  Th e Review of Economic 
Studies  175 , and further developed by Akerlof in  G.  Akerlof ,  ‘ Th e economics of  “ tagging ” as 
applied to the optimal income tax, welfare programs, and manpower planning ’ ( 1978 )  68  Th e 
American Economic Review  8 . Both economists found that an optimal tax (in terms of overall 
utility) would be sensitive to the distribution of skills between individuals. Th ey proposed 
discriminating between skilled and unskilled workers by making the transfers sensitive to 
indicators such as age, health, race and sex. Th is insight has been worked out more thoroughly 
by the tax scholars mentioned under n. 8 above. 
 11  Th e distributive equity argument is at the core of  R.  Dworkin  ‘ What is equality? Part 2 : 
 Equality of resources ’ ( 1981 )  10  Philosophy  & Public Aff airs  283 ;  J.  Roemer ,  ‘ A pragmatic 
theory of responsibility for the egalitarian planner ’ ( 1993 )  22  Philosophy  & Public Aff airs  146 ; 
and  S.  White ,  ‘ Th e egalitarian earnings subsidy scheme ’ ( 1999 )  29  British Journal of Political 
Science  601 ; but also appears in e.g.  D.  Shaviro ,  ‘ Inequality, wealth, and endowment ’ ( 2000 ) 
 53  Tax Law Review  397, 416 – 420 ; and  K.  Logue and  J.  Slemrod ,  ‘ Genes as tags :  Th e tax 
implications of widely available genetic information ’ ( 2008 )  61  National Tax Journal  843, 844 . 
Th ey claim that tax systems should envisage a person ’ s (innate) ability to earn 
a certain income, rather than his or her actual achievements, as the proper 
standard for taxation. Th ese scholars advocate endowment taxation instead of 
income taxation, and argue that we should tax David and John diff erently  – that 
is, at their potential market income  – even if they both earn  € 4,000 a month. 
 Even if endowment taxation sounds too utopian to apply in current society, 
proponents still fi nd that taxing people on their (maximum) earning ability 
should guide us as a normative ideal. Th is is for several reasons. A fi rst and purely 
economic reason is that such a tax promises to be an effi  cient way to collect the 
necessary revenue. In principle, an endowment tax overcomes a well-documented 
discouraging side-eff ect of income taxation that results from the central precept 
that higher income equals higher taxation. Since this tax is detached from people ’ s 
actual economic choices  – and income  – its avoids the so-called deadweight loss 
problem, that arises when skilled workers are discouraged from applying for 
well-paid yet highly taxed jobs. Taxing people on their market potential can be 
considered economically superior since it maximises overall welfare gains. In 
the literature, this reason has been called the  ‘ allocation effi  ciency argument ’. 10 
A second reason is rooted in ethical considerations. Most proponents also praise 
taxing talents for reasons of equity. Superfi cially, it seems quite unfair to require 
the same fi nancial eff ort from both John and David. Why demand an equal tax 
contribution when their talents, skills and competences are so unequal ? In order 
to enhance equality of opportunity and disregard the impact of undeserved 
circumstances as much as possible, this fi scal measure simply translates a basic 
assumption of  ‘ luck egalitarianism ’ from political philosophy into tax policy. If tax 
law depends more on a person ’ s potential income than his actual income, this will 
compensate for bad luck in talent and grant less-gift ed persons more equal chances 
to acquire income, leisure and job satisfaction. According to this distributive equity 
argument, it is appropriate to classify David and John in diff erent fi scal regimes. 11 
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 12  For practical objections, see, e.g.,  J.  Rawls ,  Justice as Fairness: A Restatement ,  Harvard 
University Press ,  Cambridge  (MA)  2001 ,  pp. 157 – 158 . Even proponents address this critique 
and therefore perceive ET as a theoretic ideal. More concrete forms of taxation are considered 
in light of approximating ET. See  J.  Bankman and  D.  Weisbach ,  ‘ Consumption taxation is 
still superior to income taxation ’ ( 2007 )  60  Stanford Law Review  789 ;  E.  Saez ,  ‘ Th e desirability 
of commodity taxation under non-linear income taxation and heterogeneous tastes ’ ( 2002 )  83 
 Journal of Public Economics  217 . 
 13  See  K.  Logue and  J.  Slemrod ,  ‘ Genes as tags :  Th e tax implications of widely available genetic 
information ’ ( 2008 )  61  National Tax Journal  843, 852 , who anticipate the possibility of genetic 
markers for complex reasoning and mathematics, the ability to inspire loyalty among one ’ s 
co-workers, the ability to persevere in the face of adversity, and even the ability to discern 
profi table opportunities from unprofi table ones or to distinguish trustworthy partners from 
scoundrels. 
 14  P.  Van Parijs ,  Real Freedom for All: What (if anything) Can Justify Capitalism? ,  Clarendon 
Press ,  Oxford  1997 ,  pp. 63 – 68 ;  E.  Rakowski ,  ‘ Can wealth taxes be justifi ed? ’ ( 2000 )  53  Tax 
Law Review  263, 267 fn. 10;  T.  Nagel and  L.  Murphy ,  Th e Myth of Ownership: Taxes and 
Justice ,  Oxford University Press ,  Oxford/New York  2002 ,  pp. 121 – 125 . 
 In response, opponents launched attacks to challenge the presumed 
superiority of a talent tax. Two of these arguments seem appealing at fi rst, but are 
nonetheless invalid. Th e fi rst objection concerns the underlying assumption that 
talents, competences and skills can be objectively measured. If this assumption 
is fl awed, then the entire project is in danger. 12 However, recent progress 
in genetics, neuroscience and cognitive neuropsychology might soon off er 
workable instruments which allow us to assess a person ’ s endowment. Indeed, 
some tax scholars believe that science can already validate an  ‘ endowment index ’ 
based on personal genetic information. 13 
 Van Parys, Rakowksi, Murphy, Nagel and others have mounted a second, 
more conceptual, ethics-based attack, known as the  ‘ slavery of the talented ’. 
Th is argument claims that taxing endowment violates people ’ s free choice of 
occupation. 14 Th ough any taxation system will obviously limit personal choices 
to a certain degree (due to the non-negotiability of the general tax regime 
itself and the incentives it creates), supporters of this argument assert that an 
endowment tax disproportionally infringes on personal freedom by coercing 
gift ed people to realise their potential. According to this line of thinking, 
talented individuals (like David, who prioritises philosophy) would be unable to 
pursue a diff erent life due to the high taxes they would be obliged to pay. Yet this 
criticism can be directed to tax systems more broadly, not just to endowment 
taxes. Take, for instance, a country in which it is expensive to live, even if it is 
possible to fulfi l basic human needs. In this case, an income tax of 50 per cent 
would certainly aff ect the occupational choice of its citizens. In such a country, 
John, who might have preferred a lower-paid job, will lose his freedom if he does 
not become a police offi  cer, if he wants to survive. Th us the notion of  ‘ slavery ’ 
 – meaning violation of one ’ s free choice of occupation  – does not  uniquely target 
endowment taxes. In addition,  ‘ slavery ’ only applies to  some forms of endowment 
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 15  A shift  towards ET enlarges the tax base, since it relates to the  maximum earning capacity 
and conversely severely decreases the tax rate. In the example of John and David, who have a 
maximum earning capacity of  € 4,000 and  € 20,000 a month, respectively, an ET of 17 % suffi  ces 
to attain a government income of  € 4,000. 
taxes, but not the concept as such. If an endowment tax system yields suffi  cient 
tax revenues  – to the extent that a maximum taxation rate for talented people 
like David does not exceed, say, 20 per cent of their earning capacity  – then few 
people would fi nd themselves obliged to change jobs. Admittedly, David may 
need to work a bit more than 40 hours a month to pay his tax debt, but thanks to 
the low overall tax rate, he may cut his engineering hours substantially, and he 
would not be forced to perform this job at all. In a mild endowment tax regime 
there would be no enslavement at all. 15 
 So if anything is wrong with this measure, the  ‘ slavery of the talented ’ 
argument does not explain why. We follow a diff erent approach and show that 
this project violates a fundamental concept of rights, which we dub  self-usership . 
Th is notion is a weak form of the libertarian concept of self-ownership, which 
is immune to some of the latter ’ s radical and undesirable conclusions, yet self-
usership remains solid enough to retain and integrate valuable moral intuitions 
concerning respect, autonomy, privacy and personal rights. Aft er conceptualising 
the principle of self-usership, we will demonstrate that endowment taxation is 
highly problematic, as it violates this right not once but thrice (section 4). 
 3. SELF-USERSHIP: EXPLORATION OF AN ACCOUNT 
OF AUTONOMY 
 3.1. THE NATURE AND FOUNDATION OF THE RIGHT 
TO SELF-USERSHIP 
 So why would it be wrong to demand that people contribute an amount 
commensurate with their potential to earn ? Rather than referring to the eff ect 
of such a requirement on occupational choice, we argue that there is a more 
basic problem: an endowment tax entails an a priori violation of people ’ s rights 
over their own body and mind, regardless of the weight of such a tax. But what 
specifi c rights do people have over themselves ? 
 Th e traditional conception of self-ownership has been discredited by 
controversial conclusions about the philosophical status of the human body. 
Critics and supporters alike have used self-ownership to justify or criticise 
extravagant personal rights over the human body, such as the right to sell vital 
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 16  A traditional concept of self-ownership includes the right to transfer (parts of) the self to the 
property of another person. See  H.  Steiner ,  An Essay on Rights ,  Blackwell ,  Oxford  1994 ,  pp. 
232 – 234 ;  J.  Feinberg ,  Harm to Self ,  Oxford University Press ,  New York  1986 ,  pp. 71 – 81 ;  R. 
 Nozick ,  Anarchy, State and Utopia ,  Blackwell ,  Oxford  1974 ,  p. 331 ;  P.  Vallentyne ,  ‘ Left -
Libertarianism ’ in  D.  Estlund (ed.),  Th e Oxford Handbook of Political Philosophy ,  Oxford 
University Press ,  New York  2012 ,  p. 160 ;  M.  Nussbaum ,  Th e Fragility of Goodness ,  Cambridge 
University Press ,  Cambridge  1987 ,  pp. 32 – 33 . 
 17  An example is delivered by the defi nition of G.A. Cohen:  ‘ each person possesses over himself, 
as a matter of moral right, all those rights that a slaveholder has over a complete chattel slave 
as a matter of legal right, and he is entitled, morally speaking, to dispose over himself in the 
way such slaveholder is entitled, legally speaking, to dispose over his slave. ’  G.A.  Cohen ,  Self-
ownership, Freedom, and Equality ,  Cambridge University Press ,  Cambridge  1995 ,  p. 86 . 
 18  M.  Rothbard ,  Th e Libertarian Manifesto ,  Ludwig von Mises Institute ,  Auburn (Alabama) 
 2006 ,  pp. 37 – 45 ;  R.  Nozick ,  Anarchy, State and Utopia ,  Blackwell ,  Oxford  1974 ,  p. 169 . 
 19  See for example Otsuka, adhering to a concept of self-ownership that encompasses  ‘ A very 
stringent right to all of the income that one can gain from one ’ s mind and body (including 
one ’ s labor) either on one ’ s own or through unregulated and untaxed voluntary exchanges 
with other individuals ’ in  M.  Otsuka ,  ‘ Libertarianism without inequality ’ in  H.  Steiner and 
 P.  Vallentyne (eds.),  Left  Libertarianism and its Critics: Th e Contemporary Debate ,  Palgrave 
Publishers Ltd. ,  New York  2000 ,  p. 152 . Left -libertarianism thus confi rms  ‘ full self-ownership ’ 
and achieves material equality through its assumption of an a priori egalitarian distribution 
of natural resources, while attaining an extensive form of self-ownership that includes a right 
to all the produced income (thus prohibiting any a posteriori taxation of labour-income) and 
rights to self-enslavement. See also Peter Vallentyne, stating:  ‘ Libertarianism is a family 
of theories of justice, each member of which is committed to full self-ownership and certain 
moral powers to acquire property rights in natural resources and other unowned resources ’ in 
 P.  Vallentyne ,  ‘ Left -Libertarianism ’ in  D.  Estlund (ed.),  Th e Oxford Handbook of Political 
Philosophy ,  Oxford University Press ,  New York  2012 ,  p. 152 . We do not endorse such extensive 
conception of rights over the self: as will be elaborated further, our weaker concept of self-
usership permits forms of income taxation and does not entail a right to transfer oneself. 
 20  Th e acceptance of a right to mere possession over one ’ s own body, and a consequential 
condemnation of trespass, is widespread and will be assumed. 
body parts or to sell oneself into slavery. 16 Accounts of self-ownership have thus 
mostly equated personal rights over the human body with full property rights 
over a material object. 17 Given that self-ownership includes possession and usage 
of body and mind, it also includes a full property right to one ’ s income, meaning 
that all forced taxation is illegitimate, at least prima facie. 18 Additionally, even 
the left -libertarian position does not off er us a way out, since it accepts full 
ownership rights over the self (full rights to income, right to transfer), merely 
endorsed in combination with an egalitarian distribution of natural resources. 19 
 Rather than warranting a complete dismissal of self-ownership, these 
counterintuitive rights strengthen the need for a subtler conception that 
manages to avoid these unpalatable implications. Indeed, such a concept is 
very important if we are trying to capture the fundamental diff erence between 
an individual ’ s rights over his or her  own body and his or her rights (or lack 
thereof) over the  body of others . Why do we need special permission to touch 
someone else ’ s body, whereas such an authorisation is absurd if we want to touch 
our own body ? 20 Why can we decide to join a football team ourselves, but not 
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 21  Concurring views are provided by  D.  Dickenson ,  Property in the Body: Feminist Perspectives , 
 Cambridge University Press ,  Cambridge  2007 ,  p. 14 ;  S.  Munzer ,  A Th eory of Property , 
 Cambridge University Press ,  Cambridge  1990 ,  pp. 41 – 56 ; and  J.  Christman ,  Th e Myth of 
Property: Towards an Egalitarian Th eory of Ownership ,  Oxford University Press ,  New York 
 1994 ,  pp. 148 – 154 . 
force our neighbour to do so ? Intuitively, we accept that people have the right 
to make decisions regarding their own body and mind, and do not have such a 
right regarding the body and mind of others. Hence a precise conceptualisation 
of rights is required to clarify the scope and limits of these personal rights. 21 
We believe that the notion of  self-usership , which stresses the (more limited but 
undeniable) value of usage and disposal of one ’ s body and mind, performs this 
task excellently. We defi ne self-usership as an individual ’ s right to control the 
use of his or her own personal characteristics  – including body parts (e.g., brain 
and other organs) and mental and physical capacities (e.g., intelligence, athletic 
abilities)  – and to make (legal) arrangements concerning activities (e.g., writing 
a paper) that exploit these personal characteristics as he or she sees fi t. 
 However, why should we recognise this right ? Th e right to self-usership 
emanates from a notion of autonomy which entails that each person has the right 
to pursue his own ends. Th is axiomatic right encloses many specifi c principles 
in diff erent spheres, such as freedom of religion, the right to private property or 
the guarantee for (social) security. In our view the right of each person to use her 
or his personal characteristics as he or she sees fi t, is equally inferred from the 
generic right of each to pursue her or his own distinctive goals. 
 Now, if we say that  ‘ each person ’ has the right to pursue his or her ends, 
then this concerns  real existing persons , not some philosophised imagination of 
them. Th e right to autonomy relates to how people  are  – not to how they could 
or should be. Each person is that individual entity who he or she is because of 
her or his particular mental and physical make-up  – the indivisible building 
blocks of each person. And the ends each person can pursue are not the ends of 
 ‘ humanity ’ or  ‘ rationality ’, but the specifi c goals of that particular person. If you 
recognise that David has a right to pursue his own goals, you recognise David 
as he is, including his unique characteristics (e.g., mathematical skills) and his 
personal objectives (e.g., writing a book on philosophy). Hence, autonomy 
ultimately encompasses a notion of  ‘ personhood ’. 
 However, if one ’ s characteristics are an essential component of a person, 
control over these characteristics is equally vital. A person who is bound to 
a chair, locked up in prison, forced to eat or reduced to a sex slave, has been 
deprived of his personhood. A person is descriptively a person in terms of his 
specifi c goals and characteristics, but he is normatively a person to the extent 
that he or she has freedom over the elements that construct his personhood. 
Autonomy thus supervenes on a notion of personhood and requires recognition 
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 22  We thus draw further on the distinction made elsewhere between the right to decide how 
something will be used and the right to all the resulting gains. Inspiration for a limited 
notion of ownership, deprived from (full) income rights, can be found in  P.  Vallentyne , 
 ‘ Taxation, redistribution and property Rights ’ in  A.  Marmor (ed.),  Th e Routledge Companion 
to Philosophy of Law ,  Routledge ,  New York  2012 ,  pp. 291 – 301 ;  J.  Christman ,  Th e Myth of 
Property: Towards an Egalitarian Th eory of Ownership ,  Oxford University Press ,  New York 
 1994 ,  pp. 129 – 135 ;  J.  Waldron ,  Th e Right to Private Property ,  Clarendon Press ,  Oxford  1988 , 
 pp. 431 – 439 . 
 23  In an economic exchange of labour for money, the explanation for a certain income does 
not lie in one ’ s self-control, but stems from the fact that the labourer and the employer 
grant diff erential economic value to this labour, which gets expressed in their consent of a 
certain sum of  external goods . See for example  G.  Gaus ,  ‘ Th e idea and Ideal of Capitalism ’ 
in  G.  Brenkert and  T.  Beauchamp (eds.),  Th e Oxford Handbook of Business Ethics ,  Oxford 
University Press ,  Oxford  2010 ,  p. 89 . 
of each person ’ s control over the elements that design that person. Moreover, 
since each woman or man is  – via her or his person  –  embodied by her or his 
characteristics, autonomy entails at least a right to control the use of these 
characteristics. One cannot force David to use his characteristics to construct 
bridges and still maintain he can live up to his own goals (e.g. to write a book 
on philosophy). A liberty to use another person ’ s body and mind without their 
consent would chain these persons to the ends of others. Self-usership is thus 
not a trivial construct; it is a meaningful notion derived from the somewhat 
vague and abstract concept of autonomy. 
 As self-usership equals control over one ’ s person and activities we can also 
indicate the boundaries of this concept. Controlling something means deciding 
what will happen to it. Controlling a car signifi es that one can decide whether 
to drive it, lend it or use it for taxi services. Likewise, self-usership means that 
individuals can decide on the use of their personal characteristics. However, 
this right to decide cannot be confounded with a right to all economic benefi ts 
others are willing to give. 22 Th e economic profi ts that are correlated with some 
particular activities (the ones valued by others) do not follow from any right to 
control one ’ s person; they follow from a right to transfer economic goods  – such 
as money. 23 Self-usership relates to controlling rights that give an individual 
governance over what will happen to his person, but this principle does not 
found any right to all the economic valorisations others wish to attribute to 
a decision. Consequently, as will be elaborated further (section 5.2), income 
taxation is not necessarily illegitimate from the viewpoint of self-usership. 
 Since control rights must be carefully distinguished from transfer rights, 
this principle also excludes self-enslavement  – possible under the traditional 
conception of self-ownership. Self-usership gives persons the right to legal 
actions that control the use of their personal characteristics, and e.g. permits 
John to make arrangements that he will work night-shift s. A contract that states 
that John will sell his own heart to David, or that John will become David ’ s 
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 24  A sale contract does not establish an eff ective transfer. Th e eff ective donation depends on 
the seller executing the right. Th us a sale contract of vital body parts leaves a person at the 
permanent will of someone else, and is to be seen as a variation of a slave contract. 
 25  See  R.  Tuck ,  Natural Rights Th eories: Th eir Origin and Development ,  Cambridge University 
Press ,  Cambridge  1979 ,  pp. 5 – 6 ; L. Wenar,  ‘ Rights ’ in E.N. Zalta (ed.),  Th e Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 ed.). Available at:  http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
fall2011/entries/rights/ , accessed 05.10.2015. 
 26  Put in other words : an active right without a passive right is a pure  ‘ liberty ’, as it only entails a 
right to act, but not a claim to forbid others from acting. See  W.N.  Hohfeld ,  ‘ Some fundamental 
legal conceptions as applied in legal reasoning ’ ( 1913 )  23  Yale Law Journal  16 . Additionally, see 
 D.  Schmidtz ,  ‘ Property and Justice ’ ( 2010 )  27  Social Philosophy and Policy  1, 80 . 
property (who can then do with him whatever he wants, e.g., lock him up, beat 
him, kill him or sell him) is clearly diff erent. Such acts do not fall under an 
individual ’ s right to decide how to use their personal characteristics. Rather, 
they permanently relocate such decisional power to others and consequently 
annihilate all personhood. 24 Self-enslavement and the sale of vital body parts 
are not expressions of our right to decide about the usage of our personal 
characteristics; both are instead expressions of a questionable right to transfer 
this sovereignty to others. 
 3.2. SELF-USERSHIP: A BUNDLE OF RIGHTS 
 Now that we know how self-usership corresponds to autonomy but diff ers from 
self-ownership, what exactly does it mean when someone has the right to use the 
personal characteristics he has at his disposal ? What kinds of rights can David 
invoke to secure a life as a philosopher rather than as a successful engineer ? 
 Before unpacking the particular rights that self-usership entails, it is 
illuminating to distinguish between active and passive rights. 25 An  active right 
concerns the holder ’ s own action, while a  passive right demands a certain action  – or 
rather the abstinence from it  – of others. For example, if an individual has 
the active right to possess a lawn, but the government has the active right to 
expropriate it without reason, he might end up disappointed about the scope 
of his property right. Hence the right to property will entail  immunity against 
expropriation that curtails his liberty to exploit his property. An analysis of 
basic rights thus typically does not stop with expressing active rights, granting 
possible actions to its holders, but also limits the active rights of others with 
passive rights. A right is futile unless it goes with a claim to exclude others. 26 
 Th us, if David has the right to self-usership, which permits him to pursue his 
philosophical passion, his particular  ‘ SU ’ -active rights are: 
 (a)  a  liberty right that enables him to use his personal characteristics (body, 
mind, capacities) in activities of his choice, in the absence of (legal) 
Intersentia 107
What is Wrong with Endowment Taxation 
 27  Liberty points here at the absence of legal obligations. Th is right is respected when one is not 
obliged to do anything. See  W.N.  Hohfeld ,  ‘ Some fundamental legal conceptions as applied 
in legal reasoning ’ ( 1913 )  23  Yale Law Journal  16 . 
 28  A non-intervention right is, in Hohfeldian vocabulary, thus a claim-right, as it establishes a 
specifi c duty in others. See  W.N.  Hohfeld ,  ‘ Some fundamental legal conceptions as applied in 
legal reasoning ’ ( 1913 )  23  Yale Law Journal  16 . 
obligations. 27 For example, if David wants to use his mental capacities for 
metaphysics, rather than to construct buildings, he has the right to do so. 
 (b)  a  management right that allows him to make (legal) agreements such as 
contracts with others regarding the use of his personal characteristics 
(body, mind, capacities) in activities. For example, David not only has the 
right to rely on his mental capacities; he also has the right to sign a contract 
in which he stipulates that he will use his mental capacities to write a book. 
Th is right should be distinguished from a transfer right; the latter does not 
concern agreements concerning the use of one ’ s characteristics, but the 
permanent transfer of this power to others. 
 Both liberty and management rights rule out legislation that prohibits activities 
and legal agreements within the scope of one ’ s self-usership. However, these 
rights are insuffi  cient to fully describe the right introduced here. Self-usership 
not only safeguards the permissibility of actions and contracts; it equally outlaws 
subtler intrusions onto one ’ s personal domain. Two passive rights secure the 
domain of personal governance: 
 (c)  a  non-intervention right that protects the personal domain against 
interferences with the  activities in which one is engaged. 28 Apart from 
outright prohibitions that tell a person what to do or not to do  – which 
would violate one ’ s liberty  – an individual ’ s personal sphere might suff er 
from more discrete interventions, created by measures intended to aff ect 
their decisions. For example, a government that introduces a tax or 
administrative barrier to discourage philosophers still repudiates one ’ s 
self-usership by steering people away from certain activities. Th e non-
intervention right precludes such practices as it establishes the duty on 
legislative processes not to intervene with the  type of activities a person 
opts for. 
 (d)  an  immunity right that protects individuals against intrusions onto the 
 personal characteristics themselves. Th is passive right secures the personal 
sphere so that these items cannot serve as a basis for legal interference. 
For example, a government that taxes good looks violates this right since it 
disfavours a certain personal characteristic. Th e immunity right guarantees 
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 29  Th e use of the word  ‘ duty ’ is important, as we endorse that those persons who have clear 
dysfunctional personal characteristics (because of a handicap, sickness or accident) can have 
additional claims (subject of a  right ), e.g. fi nancial benefi ts, so that a decent threshold will be 
reached. Th is does not interfere with any user decisions, but rather guarantees self-usership 
for all. Importantly, in order to be legitimate, the fi nancing of such a redistributive mechanism 
cannot be at the detriment of the self-control of others. 
one ’ s self-usership, as it excludes the legislator ’ s power to impose duties on 
the basis of one ’ s characteristics. 29 
 So, importantly, as none of the rights is interchangeable, it is possible to violate 
someone ’ s passive rights without violating his or her active rights. Imagine a 
state that forbids philosophy as either a waste of time or a dangerous activity. 
Looking for sanctions to get rid of philosophy, the government imposes a 10 
per cent extra income tax on any practitioner. Th is anti-philosophers ’ tax does 
not infringe on people ’ s liberty right to philosophise. Philosophising citizens 
are still free to practise their philosophers ’ skill, as long as they are prepared 
to pay for it. However, since it penalises certain activities that belong to the 
immediate personal realm of the self, such a tax violates the passive right of 
non-intervention. Or, envisage a racist government that imposes a tax on the 
basis of the colour of one ’ s skin. Th is measure does not infringe upon one ’ s 
liberty right, and does not interfere with any activity. Yet the personal sphere is 
intruded upon, for its elements are taken as a source of obligation for ends that 
are distinct from the person ’ s. 
 4. ENDOWMENT TAXATION: A THREEFOLD 
INFRINGEMENT OF SELF-USERSHIP 
 Th is conceptualisation of self-usership allows us to scrutinise the moral 
permissibility of a talent tax step by step. Th is project necessarily involves 
the following processes: (a) devising a process of endowment assessment 
(assessment), (b) attributing a tax base to a person according to his market 
opportunities (valuation), and (c) formulating a tax rate that will levy a part of 
that value (taxation). We will argue that in each process of this tax, a particular 
right derived from self-usership is in trouble. 
 4.1. ENDOWMENT ASSESSMENT 
 Endowment taxation requires information about an individual ’ s capacities. 
Intelligence is oft en mentioned, and Rawls also mentions the signifi cance of 
health, vigour, imagination; Nussbaum includes her well-known capabilities 
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 30  J.  Rawls ,  A Th eory of Justice, Revised Edition ,  Harvard University Press ,  Cambridge  (MA) 
 1999 ,  p. 54 ;  M.  Nussbaum ,  Women and Human Development: Th e Capabilities Approach , 
 Cambridge University Press ,  Cambridge  2001 ,  pp. 78 – 80 . 
 31  D.  Shaviro ,  ‘ Inequality, wealth, and endowment ’ ( 2000 )  53  Tax Law Review  397, 406 ,  E.  Plug , 
 J.  Hartog and  B.  Van Praag ,  ‘ If we knew ability, how would we tax individuals? ’ ( 1999 )  72 
 Journal of Public Economics  183, 207 . 
 32  Since one ’ s personal characteristics are non-rival goods (you cannot be forced to engage in 
tests and write a paper at the same time), another person using your characteristics without 
consent necessarily entails a duty on you, and thus an infringement of the liberty right. 
 33  See  J.  Roemer ,  Egalitarian Perspectives: Essays in Philosophical Economics ,  Cambridge 
University Press ,  Cambridge  1994 ,  p. 132 ;  R.  Dworkin ,  ‘ What is equality? Part 2 :  Equality of 
resources ’ ( 1981 )  10  Philosophy  & Public Aff airs  283, 324 . 
(practical reason, play, affi  liation, etc.). 30 Tax scholars such as Shaviro supplement 
this list with sound judgement, self-discipline, emotional intelligence and good 
looks, and Plug et al. also target creativity, cooperative and commercial ability, 
and leadership. 31 Clearly, in order to be able estimate our endowment, we have to 
provide tax authorities with relevant information. Aside from technical matters 
that will complicate assessment of endowment, the real issue is how far such an 
investigation intrudes upon the private realm protected by self-usership. In contrast 
to the sources for calculating one ’ s income or consumption, the basic information 
needed to assess the determinants of an individual ’ s potential income is simply 
not directly available. It requires active participation in numerous activities such 
as tests, screenings and experiments. If tax authorities require information that 
goes deeper than consumption behaviour, monthly salaries or dividends, they 
will need instruments and practices to delve deeper into someone ’ s privacy. 
 However, if the required information would have to be gauged by tests and 
(genetic) screenings, and a tax authority coerces an individual to participate 
in the screening, this obligation represents an infringement of his liberty 
right. 32 Th e liberty right regarding one ’ s characteristics implies that no one  – 
including tax authorities  – has the right to force an individual to use his 
personal characteristics in a specifi c way, and therefore to overrule his refusal 
to participate in the assessment process. Th us the liberty right reinforces the 
individual ’ s right to oppose and refuse participation in a practice that entails 
activities regarding their personal characteristics, regardless of whatever noble 
purposes the assessing authority intends to fulfi l. 
 So, the real trouble with a tax on endowment is not that cheaters will 
attempt to conceal their true taxable talents, which is a pragmatic concern that 
Roemer and Dworkin repeatedly put forward. 33 Rather, the problem is of a more 
principled nature and targets those who spontaneously grant authorities access 
to private information and demand such openness from others. Prior to the 
question  ‘ What to do with cheaters ? ’ one needs to address the more basic issue 
 ‘ Can administrations legitimately demand access ? ’ According to our liberty 
right, the answer is clear: self-usership grants us the moral right to deny others 
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 34  G.  Akerlof ,  ‘ Th e economics of  “ tagging ” as applied to the optimal income tax, welfare 
programs, and manpower planning ’ ( 1978 )  68  Th e American Economic Review  8 . 
 35  See  G.  Akerlof ,  ‘ Th e economics of  “ tagging ” as applied to the optimal income tax, welfare 
programs, and manpower planning ’ ( 1978 )  68  Th e American Economic Review  8, 9 (proposing 
a diff erential tax that is dependent on health and age);  G.  Mankiw and  M.  Weinzierl ,  ‘ Th e 
optimal taxation of height :  A case study of utilitarian income redistribution ’ ( 2010 )  2 ( 1 ) 
 American Economic Journal: Economic Policy  155 (proposing a diff erential tax of height);  E. 
 Plug ,  J.  Hartog and  B.  Van Praag ,  ‘ If we knew ability, how would we tax individuals? ’ ( 1999 ) 
 72  Journal of Public Economics  183, 186 . 
 36  S.  White ,  ‘ Th e egalitarian earnings subsidy scheme ’ ( 1999 )  29  British Journal of Political Science 
 601, 621 (proposing a graduate tax),  C.W.  Sanchirico ,  ‘ Progressivity and potential income: 
measuring the eff ect of changing work patterns on income tax progressivity ’ ( 2008 )  108 
 Columbia Law Review  1555 (proposing a tax on home-working spouses);  L.  Zelenak ,  ‘ Taxing 
endowment ’ ( 2006 )  55  Duke Law Journal  1145, 1180 (proposing a tax sensitive to SAT scores). 
access or (to abstain from) activities that are intended to provide others with 
endowment-relevant information. 
 One objection might be that tax authorities are allowed to use less-intrusive 
information sources to assess an individual ’ s endowment, such as tagging or 
proxies.  Tags deliver information based on personal characteristics that are 
diffi  cult to hide such as gender, health, height or age. 34 Tags are normally beyond 
our control, and are believed to be correlated with more hidden capacities. 35 
If tax authorities use information based on voluntary achievements to assess 
an individual ’ s endowment, they are using  proxies . 36 For instance, a person ’ s 
intellectual potential can be inferred from the proxy  ‘ obtained university degrees ’, 
and  ‘ money earned during previous jobs ’ might indicate their economic potential. 
 We do not think this method of indirect assessment is a successful strategy 
for accomplishing an endowment tax. Since by defi nition there is no necessary 
link between a proxy and a person ’ s endowment, using proxies as a tax base can 
be as arbitrary as using an individual ’ s income as a tax base, which defenders 
of this measure reject as ineffi  cient and unfair. Why tax someone for obtaining 
a university degree if doing so may be a matter of lucky inborn talent ? Some 
people work extremely hard to become an engineer, while others combine these 
studies with a time-consuming interest in philosophy. A university degree does 
not indicate a person ’ s intellectual potential. A similar argument can be made 
with regard to tags. If a tax system uses tags, one does not tax possibilities but 
involuntary traits, which only on average correlate with these possibilities. Aft er 
all, correlations do not guarantee that low-endowed individuals will enjoy a 
more favourable tax regime, as endowment taxation promises. 
 4.2. ENDOWMENT VALUATION 
 Before eff ectively taxing someone using a particular rate, we have to attribute a 
certain value to the object of taxation. If authorities skirt around the information 
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 37  Dworkin, for example, defi nes  ‘ endowment ’ as  ‘ earning capacity ’, meaning  ‘ the income that 
talents can produce ’. See  R.  Dworkin ,  ‘ What is equality? Part 2 :  Equality of resources ’ ( 1981 ) 
 10  Philosophy  & Public Aff airs  283, 316 . 
 38  For prices as a result of individual consumer  ‘ votes ’, see  G.  Stigler ,  Th e Th eory of Price , 
 Macmillan ,  New York  1987 ,  p. 12 . 
problem and collect relevant data in a morally acceptable way, they will still 
 valorise our endowments. Given that authorities aim to minimise deadweight 
losses and equalise people ’ s economic opportunities, a tax base will be imposed 
according to people ’ s potential market benefi t (i.e., what a person ’ s physical 
appearance, emotional talents and cognitive skills allow them to earn). 37 
 Th at taxing these hypothetical market benefi ts might result in the  ‘ slavery 
of the talented ’ is only a minor element of critique. Th e principle problem 
with endowment valuation is that people ’ s  tax obligations are determined on 
the basis of their personal characteristics, moreover according to their market 
value. Th is price will  – of course  – not necessarily correspond to the tax payer ’ s 
personal ends. Rather, the market price is the aggregate of the valorisations of 
all consumers in a market, and refl ects  their ends. 38 So, if David dislikes his own 
mathematical skills, an endowment tax will nonetheless impose a tax base that 
refl ects the general desire of others that he continues to work as an engineer. 
Or take a beautiful girl who profoundly hates the beauty industry she refuses 
to join. Nonetheless, her taxes will be calculated on the price others would be 
willing to pay to see her as a supermodel. 
 Admittedly, an individual ’ s liberty or management right might not be 
violated by this imposed value. An endowment-sensitive tax base as such does 
not forbid individuals from using their personal characteristics in another way. 
Th e violation of their right to self-usership is of a diff erent nature here. Th is 
procedure establishes a duty on a person merely on the basis of his personal 
characteristics. Th e fact that administrations found fi scal duties on one ’ s 
personal characteristics  – and the general desire of others towards them  – clearly 
invades the immunity right, that rescues personal characteristics from being a 
basis of obligation. Without any prior consent of the person over the use and 
value of such characteristics (e.g. through labour-contracts and agreed income 
see section 5.1.), this fi scal procedure intrudes upon an area that autonomy 
demarcated as personal domain. 
 4.3. ENDOWMENT TAXATION 
 Aft er the tax base has been imposed, specifi c rates will levy a portion of that 
value. While the immunity right avoids interference on the level of personal 
characteristics, the non-intervention right protects  the activities in which people 
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 39  Th e non-intervention right means that a particular activity cannot legally infl uence the tax rate. 
It does not imply that each particular activity should have the same economic consequence as 
such. We thank Martin O ’ Neil for his critical remark, which enabled clarifi cation. 
 40  John and David have a maximum earning capacity of respectively  € 4,000 and  € 20,000 a month, 
so an ET of 17 % would suffi  ce to attain a government income of  € 4,000. Th is would result in an 
income tax rate of 85 % on David ’ s real income, and in only 17 % of John ’ s real income. 
use these personal characteristics. Again, it does not do so in a straightforward 
way (which is a job that the liberty or management right fulfi ls), but by assuring 
a realm of non-inference that rules out subtler interventions. Tax authorities that 
respect this right refrain from interfering with people ’ s personal decisions on how 
to use their bodies and minds. Any tax policy that indicates a preference for some 
behavioural choices, for example via variable tax rates for particular occupations 
or consumption patterns, intrudes upon the personal domain. According to the 
non-intervention right, tax policies have to be  user blind and must condemn 
discrimination aiming to facilitate or hamper behavioural options. 39 As self-
usership does not include the right to income (because income does not relate 
to control of one ’ s activities  sensu stricto , see above), an income tax can escape 
such a violation if it is blind to a person ’ s particular activities. Many tax codes  – 
typically those that discriminate on the basis of occupational choice, legal entity 
or type of consumption  – are at odds with the duty of non-intervention. 
 Since an endowment tax will tax a  potential activity (i.e., the one that yields 
the biggest revenue), it obviously interferes with one ’ s activities and it fails to 
treat income user blind. For example, John and David  – both earning  € 4,000  – 
will be taxed at totally diff erent rates. John, performing his most paying 
occupation, will be rewarded with an eff ective tax rate of 17 per cent, whereas tax 
authorities will instruct David on his current lifestyle with a rate of 85 per cent. 40 
Consequently, we can say an endowment tax constitutes a  tax benefi t for those 
who opt to undertake the activities the market would favour them to do, and a 
 tax raise for those who choose not to live according to the market-preference. 
In this way, endowment taxation ’ s discriminatory treatment of income in light 
of one ’ s potential activity infl uences occupational choices and thus violates the 
right of non-intervention. 
 5. SOME OBJECTIONS 
 5.1. ENDOWMENT AND INCOME: IMMUNITY AND CONSENT 
 One criticism might be that the liberty or immunity right not only constrains 
governments ’ tax policies but also precludes particular labour market practices. 
Are companies that are testing future employees ’ skills also guilty of endowment 
assessment ? And should we accuse a business of endowment valuation when 
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it proposes a salary to a worker ? Our answer is no. Th e most important 
diff erence is that people engage in economic and social ventures on a consensual 
basis, in contrast to endowment taxation ’ s coercive information process and 
its enforcement of non-consented values for personal characteristics. Th e 
principle of self-usership permits people to participate in interviews and tests. 
Aft er negotiation and consent, they might accept certain legal and fi nancial 
arrangements concerning the use of personal characteristics, which will involve 
an  income . However, as long as David does not agree to undergo measurement 
of his capacities and does not eff ectively accept a certain level of income, tax 
authorities lack the right to act according to such measurements and prices. 
 Th erefore, from a philosophical perspective, income taxation aligns better 
with autonomous personhood than endowment taxation. Th is kind of taxation 
does not intrude on the realm of one ’ s body and mind but concerns a levy on 
economic benefi ts that supervene on this domain. Additionally, a  realised income 
tax does not one-sidedly dictate specifi c values but merely replicates consented 
valorisations as a taxable basis. Under such a system, David will not be taxed 
on controversial values regarding his innate talent, but on external (monetary) 
benefi ts he explicitly accepts. 
 So, self-usership guards autonomous personhood and makes sure that no 
one is forced to partake in certain activities (e.g. assessment procedures) or has 
duties imposed on her or him on the basis of personal characteristics. Moreover, 
if taxation wants to respect self-usership, it needs to ensure people ’ s consented 
actions. Th e legitimacy of an income tax emerges from the fact that it does not 
impose any alien valorisations regarding one ’ s personal domain, but founds 
fi scal obligations in consented and external (economic) benefi ts. Admittedly, for 
most people the market value of their endowment will have a crucial impact on 
their occupational choices and  – consequently  – their income. If people consent 
to arrange their lives according to these opportunities, then taxation of these 
extra-personal benefi ts is legitimate. However, if they do not, authorities and 
markets should respect this choice and refrain from any political initiatives that 
mortgage one ’ s personal domain. 
 5.2. CONSENT ISN ’ T EVERYTHING: NON-INTERVENTION AS 
AN EXPRESSION OF NEUTRALITY 
 Taxation must supervene upon our personal characteristics and activities 
without interfering with them. If someone uses his personal characteristics to 
trade fi nancial products, rent apartments or perform manual labour, this  choice 
cannot be the subject of a legitimate tax policy. However, nothing is wrong with 
a government that imposes taxes on the  economic outcomes of this choice. Yet 
the imposition of such taxation ought to be disconnected from the activities one 
undertakes. 
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 But what about taxes that aim to discourage harmful or polluting activities ? 
Do these confl ict with the user-blindness requirement as well ? Not necessarily. 
One might justify the taxation of such activities along independent lines of 
reasoning. Th e damage done to others might be so clear that the taxed activities 
simply fall outside the scope of liberty rights, and consequently outside the 
scope of passive rights. Since no one has the liberty right to harm or endanger 
other people, one cannot claim that taxing to deter potential perpetrators is 
illegitimate. However, this does not mean that taxation is a useful tool with which 
we can discourage any kind of harmful action. When damage is caused by a 
limited number of identifi able people, individual liability claims remain the best 
way to obtain compensation. 41 However, if damage to public and natural goods 
is caused over the long run by people who are diffi  cult to identify, taxation can 
be an eff ective instrument of deterrence and compensation. 42 If so, the principle 
of self-usership will not reject the possibility that taxation might be legitimate in 
these cases. Obviously, if authorities use taxes to favour a particular way of life 
 within the vast domain of reasonable and respectable ways of life, they violate 
the requirement of user-blind non-interference. Th at alcohol and tobacco excite 
one half of the population while the other half is irritated by drunken people 
and spoiled air is not a good enough reason for a special tax concerning these 
substances. Th e core philosophy behind self-usership is to guarantee people the 
right not to prefer the most profi table or the most innocent option in life. So, this 
principle prevents taxation from becoming a tool for pushing people towards 
economic optima and welfare end-states. When people harm others, damage 
property and destroy natural resources, they place themselves outside the 
protective realm of self-usership. However, its protection persists when people 
do not seek to eliminate risks or hindrances that obstruct the road to perfect 
welfare. Th at the best possible world is not legally enforceable is the price we pay 
for the liberty that off ers self-usership. 
 6. CONCLUSION 
 Philippe Van Parys raised the example of Lovely and Lonely, two identical twins 
with identical preferences but one diff erence: Lovely, unlike Lonely, is blessed 
with extraordinary looks. 43 Th is talent enables Lovely to earn lots of money as 
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a stripper in peep shows. Lonely, however, has no such options. Th at it might 
coerce Lovely to work in peep shows, a job she profoundly hates, is the main 
reason why Van Parys opposes a tax on endowment. 
 Intuitively, many people will indeed judge something to be wrong when 
authorities start taking people ’ s market potential as a fi scal target. Th e popularity 
of endowment taxation embodies tax literature ’ s neglect of the repercussions 
of people ’ s moral rights within tax levying procedures. In an attempt to 
supplement current consequentialist framework within taxation theory, we have 
tried to uncover the problematic nature of this fi scal strategy. By pinpointing 
the relevance of people ’ s rights within taxation policy, we tried to initiate 
a deontological view on taxation, in which tax payers are considered natural 
persons who have obligations but equally hold moral rights. 
 In this contribution we argued that the problem of endowment taxation is 
of a more principled nature than in Van Parijs ’ argument. Th e boundaries of 
permissible governmental action are delineated by peoples ’ moral rights and 
liberties, and taxing endowment simply transgresses these limits. Th e illegitimate 
nature of taxing people on their talent can be understood once we uncover a 
specifi c right of control which each person has over himself. From a more abstract 
notion of autonomy, one can deduce a specifi c form of self-ownership that claims 
that all people have at least the right to control their own person. Self-usership 
bundles several control rights such as the liberty right, management right, non-
intervention right and immunity right. Aft er introducing and explaining these 
sub-rights, we demonstrated how several breaches constitute the illegitimacy 
of endowment taxes. Th e screening and test procedures required to determine 
potential income establish certain obligations that infringe on the liberty right; 
defi ning the tax base according to one ’ s personal characteristics violates the right 
to immunity; and taxing endowments interferes with the way someone uses his 
personal characteristics and thus violates the user-blindness requirement of the 
non-intervention right. 
 Respect for each person ’ s self-usership serves as a prerequisite for legitimate 
taxation  – that consequently ought to stay away from the personal sphere. As 
income does not belong to the person itself  – and his private domain  – but is 
rather a product of consensual economic interactions, it serves as a legitimate 
benchmark for taxation. Governments are therefore allowed to impose fi scal and 
other duties on one ’ s realised income, as long as these are detached from the 
choices people make on how to use their bodies and minds. With the exception 
of activities that indisputably harm others or damage public goods, taxes cannot 
be used to instruct how people should lead their lives. Respect for the value 
of autonomy and, accordingly, the right to self-usership curtails theorists ’ 
and legislators ’ aspiration to shepherd tax payers towards specifi c ideological 
objectives via income taxation  – unfortunately a common practice these days. 
 

